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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1710 
___________ 
 
LARRY L. STULER, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-10-cv-01342) 
District Judge:  Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to  
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 6, 2013 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 14, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Larry L. Stuler, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order denying 
his motion for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4).  For the following 
reasons, we will summarily affirm.   
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I. 
 In 2010, Stuler requested copies of certain documents from the Internal Revenue 
Service (“IRS”) pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”).  In his request, he 
promised to pay the fees associated with procuring those documents, but only if they 
were “expected to exceed $00.00.”  (Dkt. No. 10-2, p. 2.)  The IRS responded with a 
letter asking Stuler to agree to pay the fees associated with procuring the documents, a 
required prerequisite for processing his FOIA request, see 26 C.F.R. § 
601.702(c)(4)(i)(H).  (Dkt. No. 10-3, p.2.)  Stuler sent another letter that he claimed 
constituted his notice of appeal.  (Dkt. No. 10-4, p. 2.)  The IRS told him that “he was not 
entitled to administratively appeal” because his FOIA request had not been denied.  (Dkt. 
No. 10-5, p. 3.) 
 Stuler then filed a complaint seeking release of the documents.  The IRS processed 
his FOIA request, sent him copies of the documents, and then filed a motion to dismiss 
his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction “because the issue [was] now moot.”  
(Dkt. No. 8, p. 4.)  Stuler filed an amended complaint, alleging that the documents he 
received were incomplete because they were improperly redacted.  The IRS again moved 
to dismiss the complaint and submitted declarations from its employees stating that the 
documents were not redacted.  The IRS also argued that, if its motion were denied, it 
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would assert the affirmative defense that Stuler had not exhausted his administrative 
remedies prior to filing the amended complaint.
1
    
 The District Court granted the IRS’s motion by order entered June 23, 2011, 
concluding that Stuler had not exhausted his administrative remedies because his FOIA 
request did not comply with IRS regulations regarding the payment of fees, and that his 
allegations that the documents were improperly redacted required “interpretation and 
analysis” of IRS file and transaction codes.  (Dkt. No. 23, pp. 3, 5.)  Specifically, the 
District Court determined that, “in light of the fairly technical and agency-specific 
nature” of Stuler’s claims, it was “particularly appropriate” for him to “seek 
administrative review of the disclosure before pursuing judicial intervention.”  (Id. p. 6.)  
The dismissal was made without prejudice to Stuler’s right to “reassert his claim 
following exhaustion of administrative remedies.”  (Id. p. 7.)   
On December 21, 2012, Stuler filed a motion to vacate the District Court’s 
judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), arguing that it lacked authority to render the order.  
The District Court denied the motion as untimely pursuant to Rule 60(c)(1), and Stuler 
appealed.   
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over the District Court’s denial of Stuler’s Rule 60(b)(4) 
motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We may affirm for any reason supported by the 
                                              
1
 The District Court ordered the parties to submit briefs “regarding the impact on 
[Stuler’s] Amended Complaint of principles of exhaustion of administrative remedies.”  
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record, Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011), and may summarily 
affirm if no substantial question is presented on appeal, 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
 The IRS argues that Stuler’s motion should be construed as a motion to alter or 
amend the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, and that it was 
untimely because it was filed nearly a year and a half after the District Court dismissed 
the amended complaint.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).  Alternatively, the IRS argues that the 
Rule 60(b)(4) motion, if considered timely, was properly denied because it was 
“groundless.”   
 We will construe Stuler’s motion as a request for relief under Rule 60(b)(4), as did 
the District Court.  Stuler argued that the District Court’s judgment was void because it 
“lack[ed] authority to render it.”  (Dkt. No. 25, p. 2.)  As the IRS points out, he is 
incorrect.   Whether a requester has properly exhausted his administrative remedies under 
the FOIA is “a prudential consideration that the court takes into account in determining 
whether to exercise subject matter jurisdiction.”  McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 
1227, 1240 n.9 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).  In this case, it was well within the 
purview of the District Court to dismiss Stuler’s complaint without prejudice for failure 
to exhaust administrative remedies.  Even assuming that Stuler’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion 
was filed within a reasonable time, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1), the District Court 
properly denied it because it was meritless.   
 
                                                                                                                                                  
(Dkt. No. 19.)   
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III. 
 We will summarily affirm the District Court’s order, entered January 9, 2013, 
because no substantial question is presented on appeal. 
